Insight- A Budgetary Derailment for U.S. Leadership in Space Safety

On July 1, 2025 the Department of Commerce released the details of the Administration’s FY2026 budget request for NOAA, including the Office of Space Commerce (OSC). This budget request, if enacted, would reduce funding for OSC from the $65M in FY24 to just $10M in FY26.  This would terminate all funding for the Traffic Coordination System for Space (TraCSS), the system that OSC has been developing as an outcome of the first Trump Administration’s Space Policy Directive 3 (SPD-3) direction “to provide space operators with space traffic safety data and services, free of direct user fees.” This budgetary decision comes at a critical time for both the US space industry,as multiple large satellite constellations deploy and commercial space activities expand, and for TraCSS itself, as it reaches operational readiness and as the Department of Defense (DOD) transitions out of providing civil space safety information. This cancellation is a derailment of policy that both poses risks to continued growth in the space economy and threatens the position of the United States as a leader in promoting safety and responsibility in the use of space. Recognizing the critical importance of TraCSS in maintaining the United States’ leadership in responsible space activities, a coalition of seven trade associations representing more than 450 companies has asked Congress to restore its funding.

In the budget justification document, the Trump Administration argues that TraCSS has not met development objectives and schedules and that “private industry has proven that they have the capability and the business model to provide civil operators with SSA data and STM services using the releasable portion of the DOD catalog.” It argues that these two factors, in combination with the continued maintenance of the DOD space objects catalog, mean that TraCSS is no longer necessary and that commercial space situational awareness (SSA) providers can fulfill the mission intended for TraCSS.

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Can the commercial SSA sector fulfill the mission that TraCSS was meant to? In some ways, yes, but in the most crucial ways, no. From a technical and capability standpoint: maybe. It is true that the capabilities of the US commercial SSA sector have advanced significantly since SPD-3 was issued. Commercial companies have developed observing and tracking capabilities as well as advanced analytic methods to assess potential conjunctions, maneuvers, and space object behavior. In some cases, industry maintains its own space object catalogs to augment the DOD catalog. Some satellite operators, such as SpaceX,have developed their own sophisticated constellation management systems. In many cases, these very same commercial SSA companies and satellite operators are working hand-in-hand with OSC to build the TraCSS services and to beta test the system. 

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The more important question, however, is whether space safety services should be delegated to the private sector. The commercial SSA sector in the US is still a nascent segment,with early-stage companies still seeking stable markets and revenue. Commercial demand for SSA services is small and somewhat unproven. Many of the commercial SSA companies are pursuing DOD funding and contracts as key revenue generators. This is a natural expression of how the space sector generally functions, where companies pursue the largest pool of potential revenue. But it means that many products and services offered by the commercial SSA industry are explicitly designed for DOD requirements and mission profiles. It is unclear whether these capabilities will be adaptable or even are appropriate for civil and commercial space safety needs. Similarly, it is an open question as to whether pricing of commercial SSA services will be accessible to newer and smaller actors, including universities and start-up companies. Shifting to a purely private sector model for the provision of  SSA data and services risks shutting out academic, scientific, not-for-profit, and other users who cannot afford to pay for access. Effective fit and continued viability of commercial SSA services business models is a less settled question than the Department of Commerce budget justification acknowledges.

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More significant, however, is the issue of trust. Trust is a crucial requirement of any space safety service or system. Space traffic coordination systems and notifications between spacecraft operators involve integration and analysis of data from multiple sources with different levels of quality and potential error. Operators must be able to trust the source of data, and the analysis of that data, in order to make collision avoidance and maneuver planning decisions. Trusted data underpins both collective space safety and individual operators’ mission continuity.

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This is a key part of the reason why the United States,as well as other national governments, have a longstanding practice to make basic space safety data to be accessible as a public good. SSA information services support a critical public safety function, supporting safe space activities for a wide range of US (and international) space operators. SPD-3 and the implementation of TraCSS sought to transition these public safety functions to OSC in part to allow the DOD to focus its space situational awareness (SSA) efforts on fulfilling its national security missions.  

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The United States government has provided space safety data to all space operators globally freely and openly since 2009 and has done so because it was to the United States’ benefit to have a stable, predictable space environment in which to operate for needed national security and other missions. This also has contributed to establishing and promoting the United States as a leading space power. TraCSS will help the United States maintain this position. While the U.S. space industry is currently leading the world in the number of on-orbit satellites, it is not the only country advancing rapidly in commercial space activities. European, Chinese, and other countries’ (both US-allied and not) private sectors are also deploying increasing numbers of satellites. Transitioning the public space safety data function to U.S. industry actors means that spacecraft operators - commercial and non-US - will be asked to trust that private sector entities, who may be competitors of the operators in question, can provide trusted data for basic safety. It is likely that many non-US operators would turn away from relying on US.data, instead looking for government sources elsewhere. This would cede the United States’ position to other state actors’ SSA networks, whether they be adversaries like China, or allies, like the European Union. 

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As a key example: several large satellite constellations are currently being deployed by Chinese entities. These constellations may pose risk of conjunctions with American operators.  Commercial SSA firms domiciled in the United States will not likely be permitted to sell data to Chinese entities; nor are Chinese national SSA systems likely to directly interface with U.S. commercial providers. Information sharing between national space traffic systems is more likely at a governmental level. It is in the US interest to protect operational stability for its national space operators.  

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The proposed cancellation of TraCSS seems to be at least partially motivated by broader stated Trump Administration goals of seeking efficiency in government programs. It is however questionable that canceling a program nearing completion, after years of taxpayer investment, truly represents efficiency, as opposed to wasting investment already made. A key expression of this contradiction can be found in looking at where the cancellation of TraCSS would leave the DOD. A key goal of SPD-3, and the establishment of TraCSS, was to allow the DOD to get out of the mission of public space safety notification and focus its efforts on core national security missions. DOD has been moving smartly and effectively to implement this transition. Just days before the release of the OSC budget request, the DoD announced that SpaceX Starlink ephemeris data will no longer be available for download from the public Space-Track.org catalog as of July 28, 2025. This was partially in anticipation of SpaceX data being available through TraCSS. The Department of Commerce budget justification argues that the DoD “continue to maintain the authoritative space catalog and will remain the provider of SSA and space domain awareness data supporting national security issues in space.” This is true as the DOD will focus on the efficacy of its national security. However, it is unclear who will pick up leadership for the provision of public and civil space safety data, as (rightfully so) the DoD does not want to continue to carry out this responsibility. In fact, Space Force sources have already indicated that they will continue to advocate that civilian space safety information functions be transferred to the Department of Commerce and TraCSS, despite this budget proposal.

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It has been suggested that in developing and implementing TraCSS that the Office of Space Commerce was building in unnecessary functions and structures,such as a full operations center,that might be inefficient and duplicative. While it is certainly possible that more efficient approaches to TraCSS might be implemented, design choices do not require full cancellation, but rather just course correction. It has also been argued that a government model of providing free SSA data and services to all satellite operators from taxpayer-funded sensors has hindered the ability of those same commercial providers to find private sector customers and investment. As we have written previously in our publication Space Sustainability and Policy: A Strategic Briefing for U.S. Leadership, a balance should be sought here, where the United States makes basic space safety information services as publicly and freely available as possible while also incentivizing the private sector to develop innovative analytical tools and advanced services based both on public services as well as the data collected by commercial firms. 

Rather than derailing progress already made towards enhancing civil space safety and voluntarily ceding leadership, the United States should instead ensure that any necessary adjustments in TraCSS implementation are made to continue to ensure that the activities of the U.S. civil and commercial space sector are carried out in a safe and responsible manner  that provides a reliable base for the growth of the space economy.